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ABSTRACT 
Over 20 years after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the actors have changed, but the 
political institution and structure remains nearly identical.  There is no genuine 
hegemonic consensus in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); basically, the same political 
tensions that contributed to the revolution are prevalent today.  The only drastic 
difference is the shift in anger from the majority of the population demanding democratic 
reforms from the West to the ruling clerics. 
Similarly, state structure, political, and socioeconomic policies from 1979 to the 
present have been consequential in producing an ideological conflict between the ruling 
clerics who seek power and authority and the reformists who seek to implement policy 
reforms. The outcome of this political dilemma will dictate domestic politics as well as 
foreign policy in Iran. 
This thesis argues that pressure on Iranian foreign policy and domestic politics 
comes from the need to reconcile international concerns of Iranian interests with 
domestic concerns of Shi’i Islam and revolutionary ideology, which limits the policy 
options available to the Iranian government.  This thesis examines the ideological 
struggle for control within the ruling elite and the decisive constraints it places on the 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has maintained an antagonistic behavior 
towards the Western world, particularly the United States, since the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution.  Today the political institution and structure remains nearly unchanged since 
the revolution.  There is no genuine hegemonic consensus in the IRI; basically, the same 
political tensions that contributed to the revolution are prevalent today.  The only drastic 
difference is the shift in anger from the majority of the population demanding democratic 
reforms from the West to the ruling clerics. 
Similarly, state structure, political, and socioeconomic policies from 1979 to the 
present have been consequential in producing an internal ideological struggle between the 
ruling clerics who seek power and authority and the reformists who seek to implement 
policy reforms within the IRI.  The emergence of moderate politicians on the Iranian 
political scene in 1997 and their political role in domestic and foreign affairs has opened 
the door for differing opinions vis-à-vis the road to normalization of relationships 
between the IRI and the western world.  The conservatives oppose reform policies which 
creates a daunting task for the moderates in their efforts to overcome the entrenched 
fundamentalists who hold and occupy strategic as well as important power positions in 
IRI politics.  The outcome of this political dilemma will dictate domestic politics as well 
as foreign policy in Iran.   
Currently, pro-reform policies contribute to increased liberalization in the IRI, 
which have enabled market forces to have a greater influence in the Iranian economy, 
thereby affecting Iran’s actions in the international arena.  The ruling ulama oppose these 
reform policies and the clear distinction in ideology between the moderates and 
conservatives contributes to the regime’s political instability. 
A foreseeable conclusion can be drawn that a political transition that puts 
reformists in power will contribute to socioeconomic and political development 
domestically as well as contribute to Iran’s greater involvement as a positive actor in 
international politics.  On the other hand, if the conservatives retain power, pro-reform 
policies to increase liberalization will be stalled, the stability of the regime jeopardized, 
and Iran will maintain its position as a threat to regional stability. 
     ix 
This thesis examines political transition within the IRI from 1977 to the present, 
specifically the period before the Iranian Revolution from 1977-1979 and after the 
election of President Khatami in 1997.  The internal conflict within the ruling class of the 
IRI and its effect on domestic politics and foreign policy – specifically the United States 
(US) and the European Union (EU) is the focus of this thesis.  The struggle for control 
within the ruling elite has placed decisive constraints on the range of economic and 
political options available to the ruling ulama.  This thesis argues that pressure on Iranian 
foreign and domestic policy comes from the need to reconcile international concerns of 
Iranian interests with domestic concerns of Shi’i Islam and revolutionary ideology, which 
further limits the policy options available to the Iranian government. 
The ideological conflict within the Islamic Republic of Iran is analyzed from a 
sociological perspective.  It examines the ideological struggle in Iran associated with the 
sociopolitical transition that led to the Iranian Revolution and the post-revolutionary 
ideological conflict that currently persists with respect to Shi’i Islam and revolutionary 
ideology.  
This thesis has three main chapters.  Chapter II discusses Iran’s transition from 
the Pahlavi dynasty to an Islamic Republic in terms of revolutionary ideology and 
revolutionary Shi’i Islam.  Chapter III discusses the outcomes from the contentions for 
power between the moderates and the conservatives in terms of the interaction between 
class, politics, and ideology.  Chapter IV discusses the current political situation in Iran 
today.  It analyzes the Islamic Republic’s political and socioeconomic reforms as well as 
the current ideological struggle for power between the moderates and the conservatives as 
the causal factor for the differences seen in the foreign policy divide between the 
European Union and the United States towards the IRI.  The final chapter of this thesis 
concludes that the prevailing ideology dictates foreign and domestic policy.  
Additionally, it suggests that it is in the mutual interest of the EU and the US as 
interdependent allies to coordinate a common policy towards the IRI.  
     x 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 20 years after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, many of the actors have 
changed, but the political institution and structure remains nearly the same.  There is no 
genuine hegemonic consensus in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); basically, the same 
political tensions that contributed to the revolution are prevalent today.  The only drastic 
difference is the shift in anger from the majority of the population demanding democratic 
reforms from the West to the ruling clerics. 
The state structure of Iran and its economic policies from 1953-1977 were 
consequential in determining the content of the revolutionary movement of 1977-1979.  
The White Revolution, specifically its aspects of land distribution and rapid 
modernization, prompted an opposing political populism that consisted of a deliberate, 
mass based, middle class social coalition.  This middle class revolutionary movement, 
under the fundamentalist leadership of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, formed the basis 
for the political resistance to overthrow Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime. 
The Shah’s rapid implementation of state power and modernization programs 
during the White Revolution was a major contribution to the Iranian Revolution.  The 
White Revolution contributed to widespread social discontent and disorientation1, which 
created a radical but pragmatic middle class movement that formed the basis for the 
political and social opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty. 
The key players in this radical but pragmatic middle class movement were the 
ulama, the petty bourgeoisie, and the merchants.  Later, Khomeini transitioned this same 
radical but pragmatic middle class coalition into a form of third world political populism 
to attack the upper class and the foreign powers while he strived to enter the modern 
world.2  Similarly, state structure, political, and socioeconomic policies from 1980 to the 
present have been significant in producing an internal ideological struggle between the 
                                                 
1 Theda Skocopol, “Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution,” 
Theory and Society, 11, no. 3 (May 1982), p. 267. 
2 Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), p. 17.   
 
     1 
ruling clerics who seek power and authority and the reformists who seek to implement 
policy reforms within the IRI.  The outcome of this political dilemma will dictate 
domestic politics as well as foreign policy in Iran. 
Currently, pro-reform policies contribute to increased liberalization in the IRI, 
which have enabled market forces to have a greater influence in the Iranian economy, 
thereby affecting Iran’s actions in the international arena.  The ruling ulama oppose these 
reform policies, and the clear distinction in ideology between the moderates and 
conservatives contributes to the regime’s political instability. 
A foreseeable conclusion can be drawn that a political transition that puts  
reformists in power will contribute to socioeconomic and political development 
domestically as well as contribute to greater involvement as a positive actor in 
international politics.  On the other hand, if the conservatives retain power, pro-reform 
policies to increase liberalization will be stalled, the stability of the regime jeopardized, 
and Iran will maintain its position as a threat to regional stability. 
The political revolution in Iran was successful in 1979, but “the move toward a 
social revolutionary transformation was effectively stopped, and then reversed.”3  The 
post-revolutionary period produced an ideological struggle that conditioned class conflict.  
This reversal of the social revolutionary phase is “characterized by a systematic 
repression of the demands of the working class, the peasants, and ethnic minorities, on 
the one hand, and the consolidation of the economic and political power of the merchants 
and land owners on the other.”4  Intermediate organizations that established the link 
between the state and civil society were systematically undermined by the expansion of 
the repressive and bureaucratic apparatus of the state.  Thus, demands within the Islamic 
Republic shifted from a revolutionary to an outright counter-revolutionary orientation. 
This thesis explains that shift by focusing on the internal conflict within the ruling 
class of the Islamic Republic.  The internal struggle for control within the ruling elite has 
                                                 
3 Mansoon Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 223. 
4 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 224. 
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placed decisive constraints on the range of economic and political options available to the 
ruling ulama. 
A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis analyzes the ideological conflict within the Islamic Republic of Iran 
from a sociological perspective.  It examines the ideological struggle in Iran associated 
with the sociopolitical transition that led to the Iranian Revolution and the post-
Revolutionary ideological conflict that currently persists with respect to Shi’i Islam and 
revolutionary ideology.  This hypothesis argues that the prevailing party from the 
ideological struggle sets the tone for foreign policy as well as domestic politics.   
The Revolution was significant in solving many of Iran’s problems; however, it 
did not lead to political democracy.  The changes that occur within a country that lead to 
political democracy are paramount, as they are the milestones of the transition process.  
The changes that grant individuals and groups greater freedom in terms of rights and 
privileges are of extreme importance.  This process of transition is referred to as 
liberalization.5  As a result, liberalization is a precursor to the attainment of political 
democracy that the masses are demanding. 
This thesis uses a historical institutional approach to analyze Iranian foreign and 
domestic policy.  This approach utilizes historical patterns that shape the actions of 
individuals that produce tangible results.  It also “illuminate[s] how political struggles 
‘are mediated by the institutional setting in which [they] take place.’”6  Formal 
organizations and the informal rules and procedures that define institutions are included 
in this method. 
                                                 
5 Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe C. Schmitter, “Tentative Conclusions about 
Uncertain Democracies,” in Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for 
Democracy, eds. Guillermo O’Donnell, Phillipe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 7. 
6 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics,” in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, 
eds. Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstretch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), p. 2. 
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The specific hypothesis that I have drawn from the theory of historical 
institutionalism in Iran suggests that pressure on Iranian foreign and domestic policy 
comes from the need to reconcile international concerns of Iranian interests with 
domestic concerns of Shi’i Islam and revolutionary ideology, which limits the win-set of 
policy options available to the Iranian government. 
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION AND SCOPE 
This thesis has three main chapters.  Chapter II discusses Iran’s transition from 
the Pahlavi dynasty to an Islamic Republic in terms of revolutionary ideology and 
revolutionary Shi’i Islam.  It explains that the Iranian revolution combined 
individualistic, organizational, and class-centered theories of revolution.  Additionally, it 
provides an analysis of how the prevailing revolutionary theory, revolutionary Shi’ism, 
and the effects of the White Revolution provided the political ideology for the formation 
of a middle class revolutionary coalition.  Chapter II also provides an explanation of how 
Ayatollah Khomeini provided the religious leadership for the political opposition to 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime, which established the beginning of the IRI’s poor 
relations with the United States. 
This thesis delineates the conditions in which the individual (Khomeini), 
organizations (the state), and classes (petty bourgeoisie, merchants, etc.) either resorted to 
revolutionary action or caused revolutionary action to occur to accomplish their 
individual or collective political agendas.   
Chapter III discusses the outcomes from the contentions for power between the 
moderates and the conservatives in terms of the interaction between class, politics, and 
ideology.  It examines the reforms in the IRI that have occurred since 1997 to promote 
privatization and foreign investment.  In addition, it examines the rising demand 
(primarily from the youth) for increased human and political rights and other democratic 
reforms.   
Chapter IV discusses the current political situation in Iran today.  It analyzes the 
Islamic Republic’s political and socioeconomic reforms and it analyzes the current 
ideological struggle for power between the moderates and the conservatives as the causal 
factor for the differences seen in the foreign policy divide between the European Union 
     4 
(EU) and the United States (US) towards the IRI.  Additionally, chapter IV establishes 
that the current reforms in Iran to promote privatization and foreign investment provide 
the potential for rapprochement with the US and ultimately the normalization of relations 
between the two countries. 
The final chapter of this thesis concludes that the prevailing ideology dictates 
foreign and domestic policy.  Additionally, it suggests that it is in the mutual interest of 
the EU and the US as interdependent allies to coordinate a common policy towards the 
IRI.  Indeed, the EU and the US will have to find a middle ground that will facilitate 
support for genuine and positive reforms that will transition the IRI to democracy and 
reorient it to democratic behaviors on the international level. 
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II. PRE-REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT 
State ideology in Iran under Reza Shah and his son were very similar.  They both 
incorporated secularism and nationalism as the ideological principle in their cultural 
policies. The main difference was that under Reza Shah, it was similarly the dominant 
cultural trend within civil society and thus the ideology of his opponents.  However, 
under the younger Shah, the ideology of the opposition changed.  Social critics and 
ideologues used Islam to address Iran’s problems.  As the Shah continued his secular 
anti-religious ideology, the gap between state and civil society widened and his regime’s 
domination over society became more explicit.7   
It should be emphasized that revolutionary Islamic discourse was not 
simply a preexisting ideology resting on the political theory of early 
Shi’ism or an ulama institutional development, ready to be used by 
discontented groups and classes against the Shah.  Rather it was produced 
by diverse ideologues such as Ayatollah Khomeini, Ale-Ahmad, and Ali 
Shari’ati, who were all inspired by the problem of political oppression, the 
states’ policies, and the highly uneven distribution of resources.  In 
producing the imageries of the alternative Islamic society the ideologues 
were constrained not only by Islamic concepts, but also by the state 
ideology itself.  Islamic Revolutionary discourse was produced in 
contradistinction with the state ideology, because for them, whatever the 
state ideology was [it] was not right.8 
  
The Islamic movement, although it appeared to be a single movement directed 
toward a common enemy – the Shah, it consisted “of various Islamic ideologues from 
diverse backgrounds, interests, and political agendas”9 that contributed to the rise and 
spread of revolutionary Islamic discourse. 
Although there were many causes for the Iranian Revolution of 1977-1979, the 
main cause analyzed for the purpose of this thesis was revolutionary Islamic discourse.  It 
is examined in terms of: revolutionary Shi’i Islam, revolutionary ideology, the White 
Revolution (specifically the aspects of land distribution and modernization), and the 
                                                 
7 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 144. 
8 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, pp. 144-145. 
9 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 145. 
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revolutionary middle class coalition that formed the basis for political opposition to the 
Shah’s regime. 
A. SHI’I ISLAM 
“Traditional Iranian society was highly religious, and religion was the dominant, 
if not all encompassing medium for ideological thinking.”10  The nineteenth century Shi’i 
Islam constituted an important element of the state ideological apparatus, and the ulama 
were an integral part of the country’s traditional power structure.11  “[T]he process of the 
people’s mobilization against the state, the transformation of economic difficulties and 
social discontent into a relevant crisis, and the effective paralysis of the state’s repressive 
machine occurred through Shi’i revolutionary discourse.”12  There is a reoccurring 
connection between religion and political concerns of various groups and social classes.  
In fact, “… religious rituals and symbols [have often been used] in the mobilization 
efforts to change or resist unpopular policies initiated by the state.”13  
An additional characteristic of Shi’i Islam is the continual exposition and 
reinterpretation of doctrine.  The most recent example is Khomeini's expounding of the 
doctrine of velayat-e-faqih or the political guardianship of the community of believers by 
scholars trained in religious law.  This concept has not been a traditional idea in Shi'i 
Islam and is, in fact, an innovation by Khomeini.  His interpretation of the doctrine 
contends that the clergy, by virtue of their superior knowledge of the laws of God, are the 
best qualified to rule the society of believers who are preparing themselves on earth to 
live eternally in heaven.14  The concept of velayat-e-faqih thus provides the doctrinal 
                                                 
10 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 61. 
11 Mansoon Moaddel, “The Shi’i Ulama and the State in Iran”, Theory and 
Society, 15 (1986), pp. 522-524. 
 
12 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 129. 
13 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 131. 
14 Muhammad as both a political and religious leader is used as the basis for this 
argument. 
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basis for theocratic government, an experiment that Twelver Shi'i jurists had not 
attempted before the Iranian Revolution in 1979.  
Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e-faqih goes beyond the concept that Shi’i jurists 
or faqihs are entitled to make legal judgments based on the laws of Islam.  Khomeini 
contends that jurists have a divine mandate to control the day-to-day administrative 
operations of the state and assume direct political authority of the government.  This 
position is highly debatable.  Critics argue that this elevates the ulama to the exclusive 
domain of the Imam.  However, the concept that Ayatollah Khomeini began as theology 
quickly emerged as political ideology. 
Shi’i Islam reintegrated the disenfranchised back into society as a sociopolitical 
opposition movement against the Shah’s reforms.  As the state continuously failed the 
general population socially and politically, many became dependent on the ulama as their 
only means of recourse.  This was due to the rise of revolutionary Islam as a meaningful 
opposition movement against the Shah’s repressive monarchy.  Ayatollah Khomeini 
asserted his political ideology and utilized the ulama’s leadership and participation in 
society to mobilize this newly formed coalition toward a Shi’i revolutionary ideology in 
opposition to the Shah’s ideology of monarchy.   
B. THEORIES OF REVOLUTION 
The individual mental state is considered to be the growth place of revolutionary 
ideology.  According to Zaret, “… ideological producers respond to the problem of 
contested authority.”15 Ayatollah Khomeini developed and used revolutionary ideology 
as many politicians do when they “lose their position in the polity and … are refused 
access to power.”16 
Revolutionary ideology was paramount in creating and sustaining a middle class 
revolutionary movement under the fundamentalist leadership of Khomeini, which formed 
the basis for the political resistance to overthrow Mohammad Reza Shah’s regime.  The 
                                                 
15 David Zaret, “Religion and the Rise of Liberal-Democratic Ideology in 17th 
Century England,” American Sociological Review 54 (April 1989), p. 164. 
16 Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison Wesley, 1978), p. 191. 
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theory of revolution is particularly significant in the formation of an ideology because 
ideology shapes revolutionary action and “(r)evolution has … a content, which is 
produced by the interaction between class, politics, and ideology.”17  The coalition of 
ulama, petty bourgeoisie, and merchants demonstrates that revolutionary ideology 
transcends barriers and forms a bond between participants created by the ideology itself.  
In the specific instance of Iran, revolutionary ideology became the dominant discourse in 
society and shaped what was to become the revolutionary situation. 
Iran was one of the strongest repressive regimes in the Middle East. “The Shah 
was a pillar of US policy in the Middle East.” 18  President Jimmy Carter referred to Iran 
as “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.”19  Thus, the 
Iranian Revolution surprised many social scientists. 
The variety of structural and organizational models advanced by such 
eminent scholars as Moore, Wolf, Paige, Tilly, and Skocpol provide 
inadequate guidelines for an analysis of the Iranian revolution.  Moore, 
Wolf, and Paige deal with the specific landlord-peasant conflict that 
produces a revolutionary outcome.  … Tilly’s organizational model on 
revolution overemphasizes the causes emanating from the rational dictate 
of contention for power and does not capture the revolution phenomenon 
in its entirety – as a mode of action and not simply as an outcome of the 
contention for power or class conflict.  Finally, in addition to the 
difficulties Skocpol avowedly exposes as challenging her theory of 
revolution, the Iranian Revolution brings to the center of the problem the 
factor of ideology, a variable ignored in structural theories of revolution.20 
 
 
                                                 
17 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 15. 
18 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 255. 
19 Suzanne Maloney, “America and Iran: From Containment to Coexistence”, 
Brookings Institution Policy Brief No. 87 (July 2001), p. 1. 
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20 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, pp. 1-2. 
1. Individualistic Theory 
The individualistic theory suggests that excessively rapid structural change builds 
up unresolved tensions that erupt into disorder when and where restraints are weak.21  
Tensions can be produced through an unequal system that produces disoriented 
individuals whose social and political ties to the government have been eroded.22  In 
forming the individualistic argument, one can argue that the rapid economic growth and 
modernization of the 1960’s and 1970’s followed by economic crisis was sufficient to 
produce disoriented and socially discontent individuals highly susceptible to Khomeini’s 
fundamentalist appeal.  Moaddel finds this argument problematic because Iran’s pre-
revolutionary economic growth was unprecedented and because he believes that the 
economic difficulties that contributed to society’s general discontent were not of the 
nature to produce an intolerable gap between expectation and achievement that would 
result in individual disorientation and confusion.23  On the other hand, Arjomand 
advances the theory of individual perspective in The Turban for the Crown.  Arjomand 
argued that rapid social change resulted in social dislocation and normative disturbance in 
Iran.  According to Arjomand, Shi’i Islam as the opposition social and political 
movement reintegrated the dislocated groups and individuals back into society when the 
state failed.24   
In Iran Between Two Revolutions, Abrahamian credits Huntington’s model of 
uneven development for the Iranian Revolution.  Huntington states that domestic, social, 
and political forces were affected by the West.  He additionally explains how the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, was produced by European economic filtration, 
class conflict, and the growth of the new intelligentsia.  Huntington’s model of revolution 
                                                 
21 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 3. 
22 Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution, 1964), p. 47. 
23 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 5. 
24 Said A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 4-5. 
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supports the basic premise of this thesis.  According to Huntington, the Iranian 
Revolution was produced by rapid economic development inconsistent with the existing 
social and political institutions.   
Although the Shah helped modernize the socioeconomic structure, he did 
little to develop the political system – to permit the formation of pressure 
groups, open the political arena for various social forces, forge links 
between the regime and the new classes, preserve the existing links 
between the regime and the old classes, and broaden the social base of the 
monarchy that, after all, had survived mainly because of the 1953 military 
coup d’etat.  Instead of modernizing the political system, the Shah, like his 
father, based his power on the three Pahlavi pillars: the armed forces, the 
court patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy.25 
   
Moaddel rejects this argument.  “It was not so much a disjunction between 
institutionalization and modernization that produced the Iranian Revolution, but rather, 
among other things, the conflict of interests generated by the very process of economic 
development.”26  Although Moaddel does agree with Huntington, that “… the state’s 
economic policies and bureaucratic expansion destroyed the intermediate organizations 
that historically had connected the state to civil society.  … [he does not agree] that the 
gap between the state and civil society was the major cause of the revolution.”27 
2. Organizational Theory 
Organizational theory takes into account:  
[H]ow dissatisfied individuals accept revolutionary ideology and are 
organized into collective action against the state.  Revolutionary ideology 
must first be brought into contact with interested audiences.  Books and 
articles are to be written, pamphlets and newspapers published, audiences 
brought to the appropriate sites, speeches to be prepared and effectively 
delivered – in short, ideas are produced and disseminated.28   
 
                                                 
25 Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982), p. 435. 
26 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 7. 
27 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 7. 
28 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 8. 
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The basic concept is resource mobilization and collective action.  According to 
Oberschall, “[m]obilization refers to the process by which a discontented group 
assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals.  Social control refers to 
the same processes, but from the point of view of the incumbents or the group that is 
being challenged.”29  This “social conflict rises from the structured arrangement of 
individuals and groups in a social system – from the very fact of social organization.”30   
Tilly provides two models of collective action based on the concept of resource 
mobilization.  The “mobilization model” is the first.  It refers to the process where 
contenders for power gain collective control over resources.  The model’s parameters are 
interest, organization, mobilization, collective action and opportunity.31  The “polity 
model” is second.  It “relates contenders to a government and to other contenders – both 
challengers and members of the polity – via coalitions and struggles for power.”32    
According to Tilly, revolution erupts when “a government previously under the 
control of a single sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing, mutually 
exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct polities.”33  The rise of revolutionary 
Shi’ism adequately explained in terms of the interaction between the organization of Shi’i 
religion and Iran’s pre-Revolutionary social conditions can be used to support the 
organizational model.34  Keddie supports this interpretation.  “Revolution is a form of 
collective action involving the process of mobilization, the structure of power, and the 
relations between the two.”35  
                                                 
29 Anthony R. Oberschale, Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood, 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 28.   
30 Oberschale, p. 28. 
31 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 9. 
32 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 98. 
33 Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 191. 
34 Moaadel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 10. 
35 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 9. 
      13 
The implementation of revolutionary Shi’ism by Khomeini supports the 
organizational model.  According to Keddie, the interaction between the religion of Shi’i 
Islam and Iran’s revolutionary social conditions contributed to the rise of revolutionary 
Shi’ism.36  As Moaddel points out:  
Keddie relates the change in Shi’i institutional doctrine in the late 
eighteenth century – the rise of the Usuli school and the decline of the 
Akhbari – to the growth in ulama power in society.  The Usuli doctrine 
thus helps to eliminate confusion among the ulama regarding the nature of 
their role in society, and provides an organizational ideology to justify 
their intervention in politics.  The ulama’s independent sources of income 
from religious endowments and religious taxes further expanded their 
institutional autonomy and political power, for they did not have to rely on 
the state for financial support.37  
        
In the context of the ulama-state interaction, the Shah’s modernization programs 
stripped the ulama of their traditional socioeconomic and political role in the community.  
Within this context, Khomeini’s political ideology and the ulama’s participation in the 
revolution support their opposition to the Shah’s ideology of monarchy as an Islamic 
alternative.   
Moaddel rejects this argument for two reasons: First, the state’s anti-clerical 
policy began under Reza Shah,38 in which the ulama lost gradual control of the 
educational and judicial institutions and their seats in Parliament.  Their religious 
endowments also came under the government’s control.  However, Moaddel suggests that 
the ulama still maintained a form of alignment with the state.39   
Second, Moaddel does not accept the concept of audience availability.  In his 
opinion, the conditions that would prompt significant numbers to participate in an ulama 
led opposition cannot be explained from the structure of an organizational analysis.  
                                                 
36 Nikki, R. Keddie “The Roots of Ulama Power in Modern Iran” in Keddie, 
(ed.), Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 
223. 
37 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 10. 
38 The first Pahlavi Shah, (1925-1941). 
39 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 11.    
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Given that Iran is a Shi’i state, Keddie’s argument supporting the organizational model is 
stronger.  “The Usuli doctrine gave the living Mujtahids a power beyond anything 
claimed by the Sunni Ulama, and gave to their rulings a sanction beyond anything nearly 
decreed by the state.”40 
3. Class Theory 
In class theory, the type of people or audience likely to participate in a revolution 
becomes central to the theory.  Marx suggests that revolutionary actors are produced by 
key historical processes such as changes in the economy and the emergence of new class 
positions following genuine and “natural” permanent class struggles.41  Class struggles 
intensify in revolt situations; the repressive apparatus of the ruling class collapses; the 
reigning ideology loses validity; the revolutionary consciousness of the ascending 
opposition negates the existing social order and provides an alternate vision of society.42  
In Keddie’s comparative analysis of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 and the 
Revolution of 1977-1979, she asserts that Marx’s theory explains the Iranian Revolution: 
The closest socioeconomic revolutionary model for Iran’s experience 
appears to be the Marxist formula, without any of the elaborations or 
modifications added recently.  This formula in essence, postulates that 
revolution occurs whenever the relations of production – particularly the 
control and ownership of the society’s basic means of production – have 
changed beyond the ability of the old forms of political power and state 
organization to subsume the new economic order.43 
 
In Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution, Parsa presents an explanation of the 
Iranian Revolution that incorporates both class analysis and organizational theories of 
revolution:   
                                                 
40 Nikki R. Keddie “The Roots of Ulama Power in Modern Iran” in Keddie, (ed.), 
Scholars, Saints and Sufis (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 223.   
41 Karl Marx, “Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy” in 
Marx and Engels, Selected Works, New York: International Publishers (1977), p.182. 
42 Marx, p.182. 
43 Nikki R Keddie, “The Iranian Revolution in Comparative Perspective”, 
American Historical Review, 88 no. 3 (June 1983), p. 591. 
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Parsa argues that the Iranian Revolution is an instance of the twentieth 
century revolutions produced by the interaction between high state 
intervention in the economy and a high level of social cohesion among 
disadvantaged groups within the third world context of economic 
dependency and vulnerability.  In Iran, the state’s intervention in capital 
allocation and accumulation favored large and modern enterprises to the 
disadvantage of small, traditional businesses and industries in the bazaar 
as well as the working class.  These policies undermine the state’s 
legitimacy as they revealed that it served particular, rather than societal 
interests.44   
 
The bazaaris45 were adversely affected by the state’s mismanagement of the 
situation, and with no other mobilization option, the bazaaris channeled their struggles 
through the mosques.  “Repression made it very difficult to mobilize … and the bazaaris 
turned increasingly to the mosque for mobilization.”46  “The proclamation of reform 
provided an opportunity for other collectivities that lacked autonomous resources (such 
as workers and white collar employees) to engage in collective action against the state.  
Toward the end of 1978, all major opposition social classes formed a coalition [which 
became a broad-based middle class, socio-political revolutionary movement] that 
recognized the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.”47  This radical but pragmatic middle 
class coalition formed the basis for the political resistance against the Shah during the 
Iranian Revolution. 
C. WHITE REVOLUTION 
The White Revolution was simultaneously the Shah's attempt at economic 
modernization and his attempt at political stabilization.  He intended to accelerate nation 
building and to enhance his regime's image as the promoter and guardian of the public 
welfare.  
                                                 
44 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 13. 
45 The bazaaris were those classes tied to traditional industry and trade that 
organized in the bazaar such as the petty bourgeoisie and the merchants. 
46 Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1989), p. 124.  
47 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 14. 
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The Shah’s modernization programs resulted in an increased dissociation of the 
state’s ideology from religion.  The Shah’s political and economic policies had a 
devastating impact on the country’s class structure and class politics.   
These policies reinforced the expansion of the state’s bureaucratic and 
repressive apparatus, hence the growth of a bureaucratic authoritarian 
(BA) state.  On one hand, state initiated economic policies highly 
antagonized the indigenous classes.  On the other hand, its systematic 
disorganization of the collectivities within civil society conditioned the 
nature and form of the opposition movement.48   
 
The Shah proclaimed, “Iran needs a deep and fundamental revolution that could, 
at the same time put an end to all the social inequality and exploitation, and all aspects of 
reaction which impeded progress and kept our society backward.”49  The Shah’s reforms 
provided the basis for his ideological campaign against his opposition.  The Shah 
associated his reign with the principles of progress, civilization, and equality. 
The Shah portrayed himself as the champion for revolutionary change and called 
his revolution the Shah-People’s Revolution.50  As the state discourse became 
totalitarian, in 1975 the Shah dissolved all official political parties.  He declared the 
country a one party system, called the Rastakhiz party.51  The regime’s new slogan 
became, “One country, one Shah, and now one party.”52   
As time progressed, the Shah demanded total ideological commitment to his 
regime:   
                                                 
48 Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The White Revolution, 2d.ed. (Tehran: 1967), p. 15.   
49 Pahlavi, The White Revolution, p. 15. 
50 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 63. 
51 Sepehr Zabih, Iran’s Revolutionary Upheaval: An Interpretative Essay (San 
Francisco: Alchemy Books, 1979), p. 6. 
52 Zabih, Iran’s Revolutionary Upheaval, p. 7. 
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Iranians had the choice of supporting or rejecting the three basic principles 
of Monarchy, Constitution, and the White Revolution.  Supporters now 
would join the Rastakhiz party to consolidate and promote these 
objectives.  Opponents could either remain apathetic and be non-
participants (in which case they would be denied the fruits of Iran’s 
prosperity) or if they wished to actively oppose these principles, they 
would be allowed to leave the country.53 
 
Brutal expressions of dissent were characteristic of the ruling Iranian despots and 
the Shah.  The Shah and a few of his close associates concentrated all major political 
decision-making powers in their own hands.  As policy makers utilized informal methods 
for control, Iranian society became de-politicized and national integration was maintained 
by brute force.54 
1. Land Reform 
The Shah’s implementation of land reform in the context of the state’s alliance 
with international capital caused a great deal of tension in the rural and urban areas and 
contributed to the factors that caused the revolution.  The concentration of 65 percent of 
land prior to land reform was primarily with large landlords compared to 15 percent of 
property owned by the peasants.  Religious institutions controlled 15 percent of the total 
amount of land while the state land or crown estate combined made up five percent.55   
It was in the Shah’s interest to stabilize the kingdom and to terminate the 
domination of the land owning class in rural areas.  To accomplish this, the Shah’s chief 
objective was to emancipate the peasants.  In light of the economic differences, in the late 
1950’s and early 1960’s, this reform was well overdue to prevent the possibility of a 
                                                 
53 Zabih, Iran’s Revolutionary Upheaval, p. 9. 
54 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1979), p. 76. 
55 Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action, (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1967), p. 126. 
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peasant-based revolutionary movement.56  This was also the principal concern of the 
United States, which pressured the Shah to implement land reform.57 
Land reform in Iran failed for two reasons.  First, it was incomplete.  Official 
figures report that few peasants received land.  Out of a total of 49,000 villages, only 
13,000 to 14,000 villages were distributed during the first phase.58   
The land reform did not affect the landless peasants, consisting of 
sharecroppers with only their labor to sell, laborers with regular wages, 
and casual laborers.  This group constituted from 40 to 50 percent in the 
villages.  Only 14 to 16 percent of the villages were distributed by mid-
1964, at which time the first phase of the reform was declared complete.59 
 
It is estimated that eight percent of peasants received land in the first phase and 
approximately six to seven percent received land in the second phase for a total of 14 to 
15 percent of peasants becoming new landowners.60   
Second, land reform failed because the government did not form a solid alliance 
with the newly liberated peasant farmers.  In addition, the Shah did not support the rural 
cooperative.  The land reform program underwent a considerable de-radicalization that 
resulted from pressure from conservative groups and the 1963 disturbances that sparked 
civil unrest across the country.  The disturbances originated from the arrest of Ayatollah 
Khomeini for his criticisms of the Shah’s foreign concession.  Khomeini compared the 
Shah’s grant of diplomatic immunity to United States military personnel, to Iran’s 
humiliating capitulation of the past.61 
                                                 
56 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 73. 
57 Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp. 134-135. 
58 Nikki R Keddie, “The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform” in Henry 
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Books, 1973), p. 165. 
59 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 73. 
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Culture in the Islamic Republic, eds. Samih K. Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, 
(London: Routledge, 1992), p. 76. 
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Land reform also failed to gain the support of the indigenous classes and 
contributed to the atmosphere of social discontent.  Further, it demonstrated how the 
interaction of class struggle, the opposition movement, and the state initiated economic 
development produced the revolutionary coalesced of 1977-1979.  
2. Modernization 
The Shah’s regime was characterized by two broad policy orientations:  
(1) A systematic attempt to exclude all the dominated classes – and, to 
some extent, the indigenous dominant classes – from major political 
positions and to prevent them from participating in important economic 
decision-making; and  
(2) The adoption of an economic strategy that promoted dependent 
capitalist development.62   
 
The expansion of bureaucracy was another mechanism of the state’s control of 
civil society.  It was likely the result of the state’s intervention in the economy; however, 
the growth of the bureaucracy resulted in over expansion that was identified as the cause 
of the failure of the government’s development project.63  Funds intended for capital 
investment were channeled into the day-to-day activities of the state.64  The Shah’s 
expansion of bureaucracy contributed to his political control of the state.  Additionally, 
“[t]he Shah used the bureaucracy for co-opting the members and leaders of opposition 
groups.  Civil service positions were created and often handed out as political favors and 
rewards to opposition leaders for their conciliations and compromise with the regime.”65  
The bureaucracy grew to an outrageous size and its expansion caused the decline of 
intermediate organizations such as guilds, anjumas (societies), the dowreh (circle), the 
                                                 
62 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 52. 
63 George B. Baldwin, Planning and Development in Iran (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1967), p. 34. 
64 Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power (New York: St Martin’s, 1979), p. 
85. 
65 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 59. 
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local magnates, the boneh (traditional farming organizations), and other aspects of 
corporate life.66 
The gap between the state and civil society grew as the bureaucracy and its 
repressive apparatus continued to expand.67  Moreover, the state alliance with foreign 
powers antagonized the indigenous classes and helped to determine the content of the 
1977-1979 revolutionary movement. 
3. Military 
It is important to touch on the Shah’s ineffective use of the military and the secret 
police.  The Shah’s administration of the armed forces was peculiar compared to that of 
former monarchs.  His military and secret police did not act without his explicit 
instructions.  The Shah effectively discouraged horizontal links among the senior ranking 
generals, which undermined the potential development of a corporativist structure in the 
military.  This helped to prevent the possibility of a coup but the result was an armed 
force that resembled the patrimonial armies that were, in Weber’s words, incapable of 
any actions without their ruler and completely dependent on him.68  Thus, unlike the 
militaries of the past that crushed the people’s attempt at revolution, the Shah’s military 
and secret police did not act because they did not receive the Shah’s explicit instructions 
to engage the demonstrators.  Critics argue that had the Shah quieted those responsible 
for the uprising from the onset, there may not have been an Iranian revolution from 1977-
1979.  
D. RISE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS REVOLUTIONARIES 
The political opposition and sociopolitical middle class revolutionaries opposed to 
the Shah began to resort to Islam as their attempt to address the country’s problems. 
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67 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 61. 
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The Shah’s economic policies and their impact on class politics provided a better 
understanding of the factors that led to the decline of secular ideologies and the 
resurgence of Islam as the dominant discourse of the opposition movement.  
The state’s economic development strategy affected the distribution of wealth and 
patterned class conflict.  The ulama, petty bourgeoisie, the merchants, and the land 
owners were antagonized by state economic policies. 
“The indigenous property owning class were the petty bourgeoisie (craftsman and 
retailers), merchants, and feudal landowners.  The merchants, craftsman, and retailers 
were mainly (but not exclusively) organized in the bazaar, which had been the 
commercial focus of the city and its hinterland.”69  The new middle class and the 
working class also increased from the country’s industrial development and state 
bureaucracy expansion.  “The new middle class, consisting of civil servants, teachers and 
school administrators, engineers, and white collar workers was estimated to number 1.8 
million in 1977.  The working class, consisting of wage earners, employed in different 
industrial sectors, grew rapidly as a result of economic development of the 1960’s and 
1970’s.”70  
1. The Bazaar 
The bazaar opposed the political elite through much of the twentieth century and 
had been an important political, economic, and social force in Iran since at least the time 
of the Qajar dynasty.  The Pahlavi shahs viewed the bazaar as an impediment to the 
modern society that they wished to create and sought to enact policies that would erode 
the bazaar’s importance.  They were aware that the alliance of the mercantile and artisan 
forces of the bazaar with the Shi'i clergy posed a serious threat to royal government, as 
occurred in the tobacco revolution of 1890-1892, during the Constitutional Revolution of 
1905-1911, and in the revolution of 1977-1979.   
In 1980, the Shah of Qajar granted a concession to Major G. F. Talbot, a British 
citizen, a monopoly to buy, sell, and manufacture tobacco for fifty years in exchange, 
                                                 
69 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 67. 
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“… for an annual rent of £15,000, and a quarter of the annual profits after the payment of 
all expenses and of a five percent dividend on the capital.”71  However, it was the 
bazaaris along with a group of ulama that organized the resistance movement against the 
Shah.   
The dynamics of the Constitutional Revolution were produced, “… when 
resistance to Qajar absolutism and protests over foreign domination began to be 
expressed in terms of the modern secular discourse ….”72  Prior to this period, Iranian 
resistance was routinely expressed within the constraints of the state’s ideology.  Thus, a 
successful rebellion against the Shah produced the same type of political system that 
previously existed within the monarchy; however, after the Constitutional Revolution, a 
new revolutionary direction emerged in Iran for political mobilization.    
The emergence of such an alliance between the bazaar and the ulama in the period 
from 1923-1924 is believed by many scholars to have convinced Reza Shah not to 
establish a republic, as Atatürk had done in Turkey, but to establish a new dynasty based 
upon his family.  Reza Shah recognized the potential power of the bazaar, and he was 
apparently determined to control it.  As his secularization programs had adversely 
affected the clergy, many of his economic reforms hurt the bazaar.  
His son also sought to control the influence of the bazaar.  As a consequence, the 
bazaar remained a locus of opposition to both Pahlavi shahs.  During 1978, the bazaar 
spearheaded the strikes that paralyzed some sectors of the economy and provided support 
for the political actions of the Shi’i clergy.  In essence, the feared alliance of the bazaar 
and clergy had once again come to play a pivotal role in effecting political change in Iran. 
2.   The Ulama 
The ulama are learned scholars and jurists, whose religious status make them 
members of the elite.  The ulama played a significant role in the polity of pro-capitalist 
Iran and continue to control Iranian politics today. 
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The bazaar was not only a marketplace for economic transactions; it was also a 
type of religious community center.  The religious idiom was the basic common 
denominator in the bazaar.  It was the major source of support for the ulama and religious 
institutions. 
Until the implementation of land reform, the conservative faction of the ulama 
continued to support the Shah.  The ulama “were concerned about the threat of land 
reform to their own property and to the land belonging to the religious institution.”73  The 
state’s modernization programs also adversely affected the ulama by eliminating the 
ulama’s traditional roles in the community.  Eventually the state’s action triggered the 
ulama’s opposition to the Shah and their ascent to the forefront of the revolutionary 
movement.   
Another important role of the ulama, in the context of the revolution, is utilized 
with respect to the principle of velayat-e-faqih as discussed previously; however, the 
basic concept according to Khomeini, states that the clergy is the most qualified to lead 
the nation.   
The prophet Muhammad was the original guardian jurist, as both a political and 
religious leader in his community.  After Muhammad’s death, the duty was passed down 
to his successor, currently known as “Imam.”  In accordance with Twelver Shi’i Islam, 
there have been twelve Imams.  The last Imam went into hiding in the ninth century AD.  
The disappearance or death of the Twelfth Imam established the necessity for the concept 
of velayat-e-faqih.  Before his recluse, the twelfth Imam did not prescribe a method to 
arrive at legal judgments in his absence.   
Traditional Shi’i interpretation limits the scope of velayat-e-faqih jurisdiction to 
three areas:  1) Guardianship over individuals, such as widows, orphans, or the elderly; 2)  
Guardianship to protect the property and activities vital to the religious life of the 
community; and 3) Guardianship to ensure the integrity of the Muslim community by 
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promoting the Qur’an.  “The existence of a jurisprudential velayat over these areas of 
community life is a matter of virtually unanimous agreement among Shi’i authorities.”74 
Conversely, Ayatollah Khomeini believes that the scope of velayat-e-faqih 
extends to a fourth area of responsibility that provides direct political authority and daily 
administrative operation of the government to the jurist by divine mandate.  Khomeini’s 
interpretation of velayat-e-faqih was developed as a theological concept to address his 
concern for Shi’i Islam in Iran from both the West’s cultural and political penetration and 
from the injustices of the Shah’s monarchy.75  Khomeini attributed alienation and loss of 
spirituality in Iran’s Shi’i community to the West and the monarchy.  He believed the 
only conceivable alternative was revolution and the establishment of an Islamic state.   
3. The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Merchants 
The petty bourgeoisie as a concept is applied to, “small-scale production and 
ownership, [retailers,] independent craftsman and traders.”76  “More specifically, the 
petty bourgeoisie are those small-scale handy craft producers and retail traders who are 
self-employed, own and control the means of production based on routine technology, 
and have limited control over investment and labor process.  In the context of Iran, the 
members of this class consist of those engaged in metal working crafts, wood working 
crafts, building and ceramics crafts, textile and leather crafts, food-treating crafts, and 
retail traders.”77  
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Merchant was translated from the Persian term “tajir” (tujjar, plural) which refers 
to a wholesale merchant.78   
The merchants were engaged in the domestic and international circulation 
of goods and raw materials according to the well-known principle of ‘by 
cheap and sell dear’.  Having a monopoly over the supply of raw materials 
for the traditional industries and over the purchase of the finished goods 
produced by the craftsmen, the merchants were naturally interested in 
turning the terms of exchange to their own advantage vis-à-vis the 
craftsmen by forcing the latter to sell their products to the merchants 
below the value they themselves would have preferred.  … exploitation by 
the merchants through trade, and the two classes’ divergent trade-policy 
orientation, offer objective grounds for conflict between the merchants and 
the petty bourgeoisie.79 
 
The merchants were extensively involved in international trade as well as long distance, 
large-scale domestic trade that contributed to increased class conflict.80  
State policies favored the large and modern industrial establishments tied to 
international capital.  However, sufficient space was provided for the petty bourgeoisie 
and the merchants in the labor and consumer markets predominately organized in the 
bazaar to conduct their economic activities.  The bazaaris have played a significant role 
in many protests and revolutionary movements.  The following three specific 
mechanisms underline the bazaars’ political dynamics.   
First, the bazaar rested on some sort of de facto coalition between the 
merchants and the petty bourgeoisie.  Except for the Reza Shah period, 
this coalition had been reproduced since the nineteenth century.  Second, 
the bazaar’s practical experiences have had direct bearing on the politics 
of religion.  Third, while the bazaar had often acted in defense of its 
economic interests, its strategies of action were shaped by the kind of 
discourse dominant in society.81   
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In Moore’s work82, the petty bourgeoisie-merchant alliance in Iran is 
demonstrated as a central factor of class politics and religious culture.  A principle dictum 
is “no coalition, no revolution.”  The coalition between the petty bourgeoisie and the 
merchants against the government exemplify the application of Moore’s conceptual 
scheme of class politics in Iran. 
Although the presence of a common enemy existed, the petty bourgeoisie and the 
merchants “belonged to the same ideological cultural universes which made their unity in 
a historically distinctive phenomenon frequently reproduced during the course of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”83   
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III. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN CLASS, POLITICS AND 
IDEOLOGY 
 
To some extent, every country and people are products of their pasts.  Iran is no 
exception.  The current political climate in Iran is directly related to its history.  A more 
thorough understanding of contemporary politics in Iran requires some reflection on the 
political legacy of the revolution.  For example, the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a 
political society.  It is a theocracy, which is defined as “[a] form of government in which 
the clergy exercise or bestow all political authority and in which religious law is 
dominant over civil law and enforced by state agencies.”84  Although, Iran possesses 
many political institutions found in a democratic political society, its primary institution 
ensures that Shi’i Islamic law reigns supreme.  The result is institutions established on 
political leaders while the remainder of the population is marginalized. 
A. THE END OF THE REVOLUTION 
According to Moaddel:  
The revolutionary crisis began when Shi’i discourse took over the protest 
movement and transformed social discontent into revolutionary crisis.  
The power of Shi’i revolutionary discourse that motivated the people to 
take direct action against the Shah stemmed from the fact that it meant 
many things to many people.  Various mechanisms were also noted 
through which the revolutionary ideology autonomously contributed to the 
making of the Iranian Revolution.85 
 
Shi’i discourse also shaped significant events in the post-revolutionary period 
which channeled ideology in a manner that resonated with the dominant interests of the 
state.  As Khomeini and his followers brutally repressed the opposition and eliminated 
their rivals, the merchants and land owners effectively blocked the movements of the 
dominated classes, such as the impoverished masses and the minority ethnic groups.  
Additionally, they removed social revolutionary issues from the agenda of the Islamic 
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Republic.  Once Khomeini assumed power, Shi’i revolutionary discourse converted to 
state ideology structured in favor of the merchants and land owners and effectively ended 
the revolution.86 
B. POST-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL ORDER 
“[T]he Iranian Revolution does not conform to the existing historical categories 
known as bourgeoisie, socialist and national liberation revolutions.”87  The United States 
and Great Britain directly assisted the Shah in his effort to regain power and in return, the 
Shah incorporated economic policies that favored the interests of international capital.  
Although one could argue that these policies resembled a national liberation revolution, 
as Moaddel points out, the Iranian case does not conform to the existing historical model 
for a national liberation revolution. 
In actuality, national liberation movements refer to the struggles of indigenous 
classes and groups against direct foreign domination.88  The state under the Pahlavi 
regime was not a system of direct foreign domination.  The concept of liberation involves 
a more problematic analysis.  Under the Islamic Republic, a more intense social and 
political dictatorship emerged.  The revolution toppled the Shah’s political dictatorship 
but intensified social and political repression with the implementation of strict Islamic 
law and the establishment of a Supreme Spiritual Leader.89 
Ulyanovsky, a political theorist from the former Soviet Union, considers the 
Iranian case to be a democratic, anti-imperialist, bourgeois, Islamic revolution: 
                                                 
86 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 255. 
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embodiment of Ayatollah Khomeini’s interpretation of velayat-e-faqih; his powers are 
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Considering its moving force, the form of struggle and the general 
demands of the people for social justice, the Iranian Revolution was a 
people’s revolution and hence it was democratic.  Considering its main 
direction, the revolution was anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist and 
strongly anti-U.S.  Considering its social content, it was a bourgeois 
revolution (for the anti-capitalist tendencies were not materialized); and 
considering the basic form of ideology and the role of the Shi’i leadership, 
it was an Islamic Revolution.90  
 
Moaddel views Ulyanovsky’s contention that the revolution was both democratic 
and bourgeois as highly problematic.  First, “the revolution did not end arbitrary rule, nor 
did it expand the collective capacity of the dominated classes.  Workers did not gain the 
right to strike and form unions, and the land reform movement failed.”91  Thus, the fact 
that the struggle against the Shah was conducted by a majority of the population that 
overwhelmingly endorsed the formation of the Islamic Republic does not in and of itself 
make the Iranian Revolution democratic.  In addition, Khomeini and his followers 
rejected democracy for the simple fact that it was a Western concept.  Second, “pre-
revolutionary Iran was already a capitalist society, and, therefore, the concept of 
bourgeoisie revolution does not apply to the changes produced by the revolution.”92  
Moaddel continues “Ulyanovsky’s argument regarding the bourgeois nature of the 
revolution is based upon what did not occur in post-revolutionary Iran, by itself a 
questionable criterion.”93 
Finally, Ulyanovsky suggests that the revolution was Islamic.  Algar and 
Arjomand support this position.  Islamic discourse shaped the revolutionary movement of 
1977-79 and autonomously contributed to the causes and processes of the Islamic 
Revolution.  Additionally, in the post-revolutionary period, Islam conditioned political 
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conflict and class struggle.  The law of Islam, as interpreted by the jurisprudent94 would 
govern society as opposed to a society governed by the will of the people.  The formation 
of a theocracy resulted from the revolution’s expansion of the ulama’s authority from the 
religious to the political arena.  “According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, 
the jurisprudent had veto power over all the decisions of the executive and legislative 
branches of the government.”95 
Nevertheless, the Islamic Revolution in Iran as a concept can be misleading.  It 
does not capture the true content of the post-revolutionary changes.  First, the principle of 
jurisprudent governance was not absolute.  Although it worked for Ayatollah Khomeini, 
it proved to present problems.  Bazargan stated the Islamic Republic “is a dress sewn to 
fit the Ayatollah.”96  Additionally, the most learned religious scholar may not necessarily 
be interested in politics or be in agreement with the political ideology of the followers of 
Ayatollah Khomeini.  For example, Ayatollah Shariatmadari’s views contradicted 
Khomeini’s views.  Shariatmadari was dealt with in an extremely severe manner; he was 
stripped of his title and clerical position.  On the other hand, Ayatollah Montazari was the 
official faqih and successor to Khomeini; however, he too fell from grace and was 
expelled from the polity. 
One can refer to the rise of Khomeini himself to argue against the principle of 
valayat-e-faqih.  First, Khomeini was not the most learned, but he was the most 
politically adept cleric, thus he became the Supreme Spiritual Leader.  This supports the 
argument that ideology is the prevailing factor.  Second, Islamic discourse became the 
ideology of power with the end of the revolution.  In contrast to the revolutionary 
situation of 1977-1979, it was debatable whether Islam was still the most important 
organizing principle of society. 
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C. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW POLITICAL ORDER 
“Political culture is the product of the collective history of a political system.  
Questions that naturally emerge from these formulations include whether there are certain 
forms and conditions of politics that are necessary to support, or at least not inhibit, social 
and economic development.”97  The ruling clerics in Iran would answer in the 
affirmative.  In defense of an Islamic Republic where the most learned should rule 
politically, Khomeini stated that the Shah’s political actions that included economic 
dependencies on the US, destruction of the agricultural sector, foreign alliances with 
oppressors and tyrants, oil sales and military assistance to Israel, annihilation of Islam, 
and Western cultural corruption were not only inconsistent with Islam but criminal. 
The Shah’s political action established the core of Khomeini’s political ideology.  
Consequently, political transition in the IRI has created the emergence of a new political 
order led by the moderates that does not rely on the legacies of the Iranian revolution but 
seeks modernization and reforms to transform Iran into an integral part of the industrial 
world. 
Neither Iran’s former authoritarian regime under the Shah, nor the ayatollahs 
within the Islamic Republic have achieved a meaningful democratic government, thus the 
reformists have emerged as a formidable political opposition.  President Khatami has 
engaged Iran in a massive effort to initiate economic reforms to promote privatization 
and encourage foreign investment as a means to provide substantive economic 
developments. 
D. POST-REVOLUTIONARY CLASS STRUGGLE 
“Two of the most powerful threads that run through Iran’s history are religion and 
the monarchy.  Sometimes allied, sometimes at cross purposes, they have shaped the 
destiny and character of the Persians from the outset.”98 
The current political struggle between the moderates and the conservatives, or 
more specifically President Khatami and his supporters and Ayatollah Khameini and the 
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supporters of the ruling clerics, is a direct result of this legacy.  According to Miklos, the 
successes and failures of Iran can be explained in its historical past, its cultural legacy, 
and its institutions.  Post-revolutionary change was almost inevitable as the class 
leadership emerged from the revolution and “participated in political struggles as a 
distinct social strata with specific interests.”99 
In the case of Iran, Khomeini espoused a cross-class ideology based on Shi’i 
Islam.  However, as the middle-class divided into various social strata with different 
economic interests and positions, “[t]he internal heterogeneity of the middle class [was] 
further exacerbated by divisions along ideological and political stands.  The class, for 
example, includes secular and religious tendencies, highly literate and illiterate people, 
modernists and traditionalists, and Leftists, Rightists and Centrists groups.”100  
Amirahmadi argues that it is the main reason the middle-class lacks a coherent, strictly 
middle-class ideology, and stable political stance.  This led to ideological factionalism 
and practical difficulties for the post-revolutionary leadership. 
Another difficulty that emerged from the cross class ideology of the middle-class 
leadership of the revolution was the inability to formulate a coherent, unified 
development strategy for reconstruction of the post-revolutionary society.  According to 
Tilly, middle class revolutions are largely nationalistic and often adopt an indigenous 
ideology.101  Keddie and Hooglund agree that in the case of Iran, where the revolution 
was to dispel foreign influences, it was only natural to rely upon a native ideology such 
as shi’ism.102  While most within the middle class were motivated to advance their 
socioeconomic and political position toward moderation, pragmatism, and reformism,103 
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the leadership of the Islamic Revolution moved toward radicalism and strict ideological 
considerations of Islam. 
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IV. POST-REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT 
The ideological struggle for power between the moderates and the conservatives 
is the major issue of contention in the IRI.  Amirahmadi stated that the prevailing 
ideology “is a conjectural matter and depends on the relative strength of the various 
strata, their authenticity and ability to legitimize their drive for hegemony in the larger 
society, and the nature of the political movement.”104  
In light of the fact that Khatami has been elected to two terms as President by an 
overwhelming margin each time and that the majority of the population is demanding 
democratic reforms, one would assume that the moderates would easily assume power.  
However, the conservatives are relying on many of the radical methods of Khomeini to 
retain power and maintain authority over the Islamic Republic.  For example, the 
hardliners105 have led relentless attacks against the media.  Several newspapers have been 
suspended or permanently closed.106  Numerous journalists have been arrested and 
prosecuted and there have been disappearances and suspicious deaths of several writers 
and free expression advocates for criticism of the Islamic Republic and its philosophical 
foundations.107  Khameini publicly accused certain newspapers of succumbing to western 
attitudes about Islam and the revolution.  Khameini stated that “critique or criticism of 
the government’s policies are not bad, but when someone attempts to undermine the 
foundations of the government, it is a treason and not freedom of expression.”108 
In response, students have staged demonstrations in Tehran to protest the state’s 
repressive measures against the press. 
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A. POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC REFORMS 
President Khatami wants to make fundamental changes in Iran’s foreign relations 
as well as liberalize the revolution.  Khatami believes there should not be a clash of 
cultures and that Islam and other cultures have much to teach one another.  These views 
are in direct contradiction with the conservative mullahs that control Iran’s key 
institutions – military, judiciary, and state television and radio – and have exerted their 
authority with a vengeance to restrain reformers and retain their power. 109  Khatami has 
made efforts to improve relations with the Arab Gulf States and the Arab world, he has 
begun a dialogue with Iraq at the Ministerial level, and he has improved relations with 
Turkey. 110  In addition, Khatami has taken new steps to improve the Islamic Republic’s 
relations with the European Union and to some extent the United States. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES – 
CONTAINMENT OR COOPERATION 
 
1. European Union 
There is a consensus of most Middle East experts that Iran requires both 
investment and financial credit to ignite its dismal economy.  Thus, continued relations 
with Europe are vital for the economic development of the Islamic Republic in light of 
the ongoing hostility between Iran and the United States. 
The European Union has continued to make overtures for normal relations with 
Iran.  Many European countries have welcomed Khatami’s initiative to open relations 
with the West.  “Although they are not comfortable with it, even Iran’s conservatives 
recognize the importance of normalizing ties with the West – falling oil prices over the 
past decade have diminished Iran’s ability to go it alone economically, and restoring trade 
relations with stronger economies has become critical to Iran’s well-being.”111 
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“Iran’s relationship with Europe has [arguably] always been better than its 
relationship with the United States.  Many European countries maintained diplomatic ties 
and commercial relations with Iran, even during the heady days of the revolution.”112  
Critical dialogue between Europe and Iran has continued since 1992, however, little has 
taken place to influence Iranian behavior.  Conversely, in 1999 Khatami visited several 
European countries and European leaders declared that Iran was no longer committing 
terrorist acts abroad and that it was cooperating on women’s issues.113 
Byman argues that Iran intentionally sought to divide Europe from the US by 
offering the Europeans access to its markets.  It is also believed that Iran wants to 
encourage foreign investment from Europe and Japan to isolate the United States.114 
2. United States 
On September 11, 2002, the United States experienced the worst terrorist attack in 
its history by an Islamist cell linked to Usamah bin Laden.  In a multi-plane hijacking, the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked and thousands of citizens were 
killed.  The US launched an International War against terrorism and solicited the support 
of all the Middle Eastern countries.  Iran declined to participate in a US led Anti-Terror 
Coalition. 115  Iran’s refusal to participate is partly due to US support for Israel – “enemy 
of Iran and Islam”116 and because of the US’s position as the lead country.  However, the 
following responses from Iran are indicative of its decentralized rule and political 
instability.  Khatami stated that Iran would participate in a UN lead Anti-Terror coalition 
– demonstrating neutrality to the US but support for the cause.  After a speech in which 
President Bush condemned terrorist attacks against the US, Ayatollah Khameini publicly 
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stated that the US cannot escape judgment for its own action – an open and hostile 
admonishment of the US.  The general public in Iran empathizes with the US.  On one 
occasion, Iranians gave a moment of silence to the victims of the “9-11” tragedy during a 
soccer game and on another occasion Iranians gathered at a public park to demonstrate 
publicly – both expressions of sympathy in support of the US. 
In light of the current circumstances and after more than 20 years of animosity, 
the US has adopted a more cautious position towards Iran than Europe.  The US has 
indicated a willingness to open dialogue with Iran.  However, at the same time the US has 
given Khatami the kiss of death, from accusations of Iran’s assistance to Taliban and al-
Qaeda members after September 11 and from comments made by President Bush in his 
State of the Union address in January 2002. 
President Bush publicly accused Iran of assisting Taliban and al-Qaeda members 
that had crossed the border into Iran and for supporting rebel forces in Afghanistan.  Iran 
vehemently denied the accusations.  President Khatami stated that the border was 600 
miles long and that if the US pointed out where rebels were crossing the border Iran 
would apprehend them.117  Additionally, in his State of the Union address, President 
Bush identified North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as part of an “Axis of Evil.”118  This has 
arguably been the harshest language used by any US administration to describe these 
countries.  Once again, Iran vehemently rejected the charges.  According to the official 
state news agency in Iran, IRNA, the Islamic Republic considered President Bush’s 
remarks as interference in its internal affairs. 
Although relations between the US and Iran are warming, there is still a great deal 
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C. THE POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION 
In order to evaluate the potential for cooperation between the US and Iran, one 
must analyze the current reforms in the Islamic Republic in relation to its political 
resistance with the mechanisms necessary for change. 
The reform movement has transformed the domestic debate from one concerned 
with whether the Islamic system should change to one focused on how much and how 
quickly the change should occur.  Although the hardliners do not want to see the mending 
of relations with the US (the so-called “Great Satan”), President Khatami has clearly 
pursued an agenda with the intention of rapprochement.  At the meeting of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference in Tehran in 1997, President Khatami stated that 
Islamic civil society and its western counterpart were not necessarily in conflict in their 
manifestations and consequences and that Iran should not be oblivious to positive 
accomplishments of Western civil society.119  Additionally, Khatami condemned 
terrorism and called for peaceful relations among all Islamic states. 
Similar to the hardliners but from a cautious vice ideological perspective, there 
are US policy makers that are not optimistic about the future of political relations with 
Iran.  In “The Rise of Iran’s Reformers,” James Phillips of the Heritage Foundation 
suggests that the US remain cautious in its responses to Iran and “maintain economic 
sanctions to give Tehran maximum incentives to end its support of terrorism, violent 
opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, and development of weapons of mass 
destruction.”120 
Michael Rubin agrees that no diplomatic or economic carrots should be used 
when dealing with Iran until the government reigns in its vigilante judiciary, military, and 
security forces that oppose US-Iran relations.121 
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Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
disagrees with the use of sanctions.  Cordesman states that sanctions have never been 
useful and should be repealed along with Executive Orders blocking trade and limiting 
US-Iran non-official contact if prospects for a breakthrough in US-Iranian relations 
should suddenly improve.122  Likewise, the Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, former US 
Secretary of State, agrees that it is time for the US to establish diplomatic relations with 
Iran.123  Secretary Vance believes that once diplomatic relations are established other 
legitimate grievances, including US concerns about terrorism, the peace process, and 
weapons of mass destruction, can be addressed. 
1. The Basis for Political Resistance 
According to Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center, it is in America’s strategic 
interest to seek normal relations with Iran.  Kemp lists the following realities as 
conditions to present US-Iranian relations: 
                                                 
122 Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Gulf in Transition US Policy Ten Years After 
the Gulf War: The Challenge of Iran” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, October 30, 2000). 
123 “US-Iran Relations: Has the Time Come?”, www.Iranian.com. 
      42 
First, the Clinton Administration’s attempt to isolate Iran politically 
through containment has failed.  Second, Iran’s anti-Israeli policy is a 
major obstacle to normalization.  So long as Iran pursues policies that 
directly threaten Israel, neither the Clinton Administration nor the 
Congress will initiate or accept radical changes in American policy.  
Third, the election of Mohammed Khatami to the Iranian presidency has 
radically changed the dynamics of Iranian domestic politics.  Yet, until he 
and his moderate supporters gain control of the key instruments of power, 
his proposed reforms and even his tenure in office could be in jeopardy.  
Fourth, unfavorable economic and demographic trends in Iran pose serious 
challenges for any Iranian leader, whether moderate, centrist or radical.  
Fifth, the negative impact of American sanctions on Iran’s vital energy 
sector provides a strong incentive for the regime to improve relations with 
the United States.  Sixth, America remains a dominant factor in Iran’s 
strategic, political, economic, and psychic ethos.  The regime’s 
conservatives realize that a rapprochement will inevitably mean a 
diminution, if not end, to their power.  Seventh, Iran faces serious security 
challenges in its neighborhood.  It will continue to develop surface-to-
surface missiles and an infrastructure to exercise a nuclear weapons option 
in event that the security environment deteriorates.124 
 
Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institute agrees with Kemp that the conditions 
that form the basis for the political resistance between the US and Iran can be broken 
down accordingly:  Washington’s concerns about Iran focus on three primary areas:  
Iran’s support for terrorism; Iran’s opposition to the Middle East Peace Process; and the 
development of weapons of mass destruction.  Secondary American concerns include 
human rights violations, especially as they relate to Iran’s religious minorities.   
Iran’s position is also well established, its government has consistently rejected 
direct diplomatic contacts with Washington while: sanctions remain in place and pre-
revolutionary financial claims remain outstanding.  Tehran also vigorously disputes the 
US military presence in the Gulf and a host of American policies toward the region, past 
and present.  The escalating cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence has shattered the fragile 
beginnings of regional reconciliation and consumed US diplomacy.125 
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While the differences for the stand-off are clear, the mechanisms for addressing 
them are not.  Both sides present divergent demands that effectively negate one another.   
Washington insists on a government-to-government dialogue approach before 
considering its restrictions on trade and investment against Iran, however, Iran demands a 
resumption of economic ties and refuses to condone any normal diplomatic interchange 
until these conditions are met. 
2. Mechanisms for Change 
Both Kemp and Maloney concur that Khatami’s modest progress to reform Iran 
can facilitate rapprochement.  Maloney suggests that the following key common interests 
that the US and Iran share can provide for a new approach to reconciliation: 1) managing 
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein restricting the flow of drugs and unrest from 
Afghanistan and 2) establishing greater stability in the troubled Caucasus region.  
Commercial ties would both benefit Iran’s troubled economy and open US companies to 
an untapped consumer market and massive energy reserves that are ripe for increased 
investment.126 
In addition, Iran has a disproportionately young and well-educated population that 
is situated at the wellspring of the world’s petroleum supplies and at the crossroads of 
Asia’s emerging democracies and markets.  These youth are uniquely positioned to either 
enhance the interests of the US and its allies in a peaceful and economically vibrant 
future, or, alternatively, situated to sow greater chaos and instability.127 
Puneet Talwar128 and Daniel Brumberg129 both agree that the time for moderate 
engagement of Iran is now. Talwar suggests that American policy make subtle but 
significant shifts to encourage Iran’s evolution in a direction to benefit both countries.  
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He uses the election of Khatami to a second term as president as evidence that the Iranian 
public endorses further change.  Brumberg goes one step further.  He suggests that 
political and economic incentives be used to engage Iran.  Brumberg recommends that 
Iran be encouraged to cooperate in Afghanistan and that economic sanctions be lifted in 
exchange for “Tehran’s unambiguous official commitment to back peace between the 
Palestinians and Israel and to cease all support for Palestinian groups or individuals 
resorting to terrorism.”130 
In opposition to this view, Michael Rubin131 recommends that diplomatic and 
economic interaction remain at a standstill until Islamist conservatives have been put in 
check.  Ruben’s position is that as long as legally constituted forces within the judiciary, 
military, and secret police as well as extremist groups adamantly oppose the reformists, 
neither diplomatic nor economic carrots should be offered. 
Wilfried Buchta132 paints a different picture.  Buchta suggests that Khatami may 
not prevail in the reformists struggle for power against the conservatives and that 
Khatami’s future may equal Bani-Sadr’s past. 
3. Rapprochement 
Kemp believes there is potential for limited rapprochement between the US and 
Iran and the odds have greatly improved since the election of Khatami as President. 
Domestically, according to Maloney, reformers must “build on their institutional 
strengths by replacing the recalcitrant members of Khatami’s compromise cabinet ....  
Domestic reform must find new allies among the conservatives’ pragmatic wing, which is 
increasingly adjusting to Iran’s new political climate and arguing for change as a 
religious imperative.”133 
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On the international level, Khatami has initiated a reform program.  The general 
consensus among the upper hierarchy supports the expansion of Iranian relations with 
regional and international allies, such as India, China, and Russia.  Annually, in excess of 
750,000 Iranians enter an economy with insufficient opportunities to support them; 
greater than 50 percent will face unemployment.134  Khatami’s calibrated attempt to 
establish alliances with important regional allies will affect this economic imperative on 
Iran’s foreign policy. 
It is imperative that any new approach ensures that the Iranian government has an 
increased interest in its own stability and peace (which includes no longer supporting 
terrorism) within the Middle East region.  This approach must also engage Iran in a 
dialogue of the most urgent American concerns and encompass durable but varied 
incentives and penalties.  The question of incentives versus isolation or containment 
remains.  The prevailing logic that isolation presents the US’s most powerful weapon is 
erroneous; incentives are a significant improvement to this view. 
In its internal political struggle, Iran must convincingly demonstrate an 
international pragmatism that can effectively maximize US influence.  Isolation or 
containment of Iran contributes to the political cause of the hardliners and should be 
avoided.  Elimination of the lack of diplomatic discourse with modest economic 
engagement and the Islamic Republic will promote compliance with international rules 
and standards, and incorporate a greater regional stake in the government’s future.135 
Commercial interaction can facilitate diplomatic relations, such as with the 
British-Iranian rapprochement.  With incentives, Iranian foreign affairs can improve and 
increased trade with Europe will continue to demonstrate the importance of dispute 
resolution. 
                                                 
134 Maloney, p. 5. 
135 Maloney, pp. 5-6. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Iranian Revolution was an amalgamation of many different factors that 
worked collectively to produce this unique outcome.  Individually, they would not have 
had the force to provide the foundation for a revolution. 
Revolutionary theory combined several perspectives of revolutionary thoughts to 
produce the correct ideologies and class for the revolution and the White Revolution 
created the external stimuli to prompt the multiple classes to form a coalition. 
The Revolutionary middle class which provided the foundation for the revolution 
was, “…dissatisfied with the state’s economic policy.  However, neither their grievances 
nor their organizations and resources by themselves explained their revolutionary actions 
against the state.”136  However, in conjunction with Shi’i revolutionary discourse and the 
fundamental leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, the actions of the members of the middle 
class coalition moved in a revolutionary direction to overthrow the Shah’s regime. 
Currently, the ideological battle for control persists in Iran; however, this internal 
struggle for power between the ruling clerics and the reformists must play out before Iran 
can effectively transition into democracy.  The masses are demanding that the Islamic 
Republic move in the direction of social evolutionary transformation.  Thus, the question 
is no longer will transformation take place but when.  Additionally, the US should 
discontinue its policy to influence the internal political struggle in Iran based on its 
consistent miscalculation of the intricacies of Iran’s domestic politics. 
The US desperately needs a new approach, as containment has not achieved its 
desired objectives of isolating the Islamic Republic, converting the regime to the cause of 
regional peace, and preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  In addition, 
containment has promoted ineffective policies that have alienated US allies.  The new 
approach must prevent terrorism, proliferation, ensure energy security, and promote 
human rights while fulfilling US national interests.  
Political development in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been dependent on the 
internal class struggle for power between the ruling elite.  Iran remains a dominant, 
                                                 
136 Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, p. 99. 
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political, economic, and military power in the Middle East― a region that holds the 
largest portion of the world’s energy reserve. Undoubtedly, the Western World would 
prefer to see the IRI become a progressive and democratic state with whom they could 
normalize and deepen their relations.  However, before this transition becomes a reality, 
the moderates in Iran face a daunting task in their efforts to overcome the deeply 
entrenched fundamentalists who hold and occupy strategic, as well as, important 
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